Lo dicho, sólo en la Venezuela chavista, donde la mediocridad, la falta de criterio, y la voluntaria abyección son los valores más preciados, puede una persona tan deficiente como Eva Golinger alcanzar posiciones de relativa importancia. Eva se ha dado a la tarea de promover desde su púlpito ciertas medidas que dificultan el legitimo trabajo de ONGs venezolanas. La reciente ley que prohibe a las ONGs aceptar donaciones de entidades foráneas es un ejemplo de ello. Sumida en su colorada monotonía, Eva no desea reconocer que la ley que ahora propone habría privado a su "amado, imprescidible, incansable y único Comandante Presidente Hugo Chávez" del 1,5 millones de dólares recibidos del BBVA (ver pag. 5 y 7), cuando los dineros de Venezuela no estaban a la disposición del caudillo comunista por allá en 1999.
Showing posts with label hugo chavez.. Show all posts
Showing posts with label hugo chavez.. Show all posts
23 December 2010
Reframing democratic deficit's debate: Chavez's Venezuela
After the parliamentary elections of December 2005, the National Electoral Council of Venezuela took more than 42 days to announce results. The CNE, at the time chaired by Jorge Rodriguez (later appointed Chavez’s Vice President), had trouble massaging abstention figures, which to this day are believed to have been above 85%. The current crop of people’s representatives were elected in 2005 by at best, 15% of Venezuela's electorate. Eventually, Rodriguez did come up with figures more amenable to the caudillo, decreasing the abstention rate to around 75%.
In any case, this percentage in a country where participation levels hover around 70% was extraordinarily odd. The reason was a little reported event that took place in Caracas, on 23 November 2005.
In the presence of electoral observers from Venezuela, Europe and the Organisation of American States (OAS), a representative of the opposition was allowed near a Smartmatic voting machine, for the first and only time ever since. The technician connected his laptop to the voting machine, ran a programme, and started calling out loud how different participants had voted: “Mr. Black you voted A; Mr. Green you voted B; Mr. White you vo...”
Before the third call was made, Jorge Rodriguez abruptly stopped the exercise, ordered the end of the meeting, and dismissed all of those present. Opposition parties claimed at the time that the secrecy of the vote was compromised, and therefore they withdrew from the race en masse. This gave Chavez the current, lame duck congress.
For the last five years, representatives of a minority of Venezuelans have been rubber stamping Chavez's whims. Opposition-aligned candidates obtained 52% of the vote, in the last parliamentary elections held 26 September. Still, due to malapportionment, gerrymandering and favourable electoral legislation, Chavez's representatives managed to get a simple majority in the new congress, which in practical terms means that he will no longer be able to steam roll legislation.
Democratic tenets, or being subjected to the will of the majority is not something that keeps Chavez up at night. Foreseeing problems with the opposition bloc, Chavez prepared the ground for coming presidential elections in 2012. He demanded from his congressional minions powers to rule by decree, which were duly granted without much ado, for the next 18 months. The new congress will convene for the first time on 5 January 2011. However Chavez will be able to circumvent congressional hurdles and, more importantly, has created a parallel State structure rapidly approved in congress, whereby power and massive budgets will be deviated to communal organisations under his control.
It is ironic that the debate about democratic deficit is mentioned in relation to a country that has had plenty of elections in the last 11 years. However, contrary to what Chavez's apologists argue, many elections do not necessarily mean an abundance of democracy.
Perhaps the person that best exemplifies Chavez's Venezuela democratic deficit is the opposition politician Antonio Ledezma, elected Mayor of Caracas in 2008. Unwilling to concede defeat in the country's capital, Chavez created a new role, above the office of the mayor in the city's institutional hierarchy, and stripped the mayor of budget and all powers of his office, rendering electoral results and local democracy meaningless. The power to create such roles, and name totally subservient appointees, was proposed by Chavez in a constitutional amendment put to vote in 2007. It was roundly rejected by the public in the 2007 referendum, but since then, the lame duck congress has made sure to grant Chavez enough power to push through undemocratic reforms without consultation, in violation of electoral results.
In its last days, the chavista congress has rushed through legislation to:
· criminalise freedom of expression and dissent in congress;
· control internet and silence the media;
· block funding to NGOs;
· assault universities' independence -where Chavez is yet to win his first election;
· transfer city halls, governorships, congress, public prosecution, economic planning powers and budgets to Chavez's communes.
It must be borne in mind that this is being done after the election of a new, more representative congress, and in addition to the power to rule by decree for the following 18 months. In conclusion, Venezuela can no longer be called a democracy for one simple reason: actions of the dictator in charge prove otherwise.
In any case, this percentage in a country where participation levels hover around 70% was extraordinarily odd. The reason was a little reported event that took place in Caracas, on 23 November 2005.
In the presence of electoral observers from Venezuela, Europe and the Organisation of American States (OAS), a representative of the opposition was allowed near a Smartmatic voting machine, for the first and only time ever since. The technician connected his laptop to the voting machine, ran a programme, and started calling out loud how different participants had voted: “Mr. Black you voted A; Mr. Green you voted B; Mr. White you vo...”
Before the third call was made, Jorge Rodriguez abruptly stopped the exercise, ordered the end of the meeting, and dismissed all of those present. Opposition parties claimed at the time that the secrecy of the vote was compromised, and therefore they withdrew from the race en masse. This gave Chavez the current, lame duck congress.
For the last five years, representatives of a minority of Venezuelans have been rubber stamping Chavez's whims. Opposition-aligned candidates obtained 52% of the vote, in the last parliamentary elections held 26 September. Still, due to malapportionment, gerrymandering and favourable electoral legislation, Chavez's representatives managed to get a simple majority in the new congress, which in practical terms means that he will no longer be able to steam roll legislation.
Democratic tenets, or being subjected to the will of the majority is not something that keeps Chavez up at night. Foreseeing problems with the opposition bloc, Chavez prepared the ground for coming presidential elections in 2012. He demanded from his congressional minions powers to rule by decree, which were duly granted without much ado, for the next 18 months. The new congress will convene for the first time on 5 January 2011. However Chavez will be able to circumvent congressional hurdles and, more importantly, has created a parallel State structure rapidly approved in congress, whereby power and massive budgets will be deviated to communal organisations under his control.
It is ironic that the debate about democratic deficit is mentioned in relation to a country that has had plenty of elections in the last 11 years. However, contrary to what Chavez's apologists argue, many elections do not necessarily mean an abundance of democracy.
Perhaps the person that best exemplifies Chavez's Venezuela democratic deficit is the opposition politician Antonio Ledezma, elected Mayor of Caracas in 2008. Unwilling to concede defeat in the country's capital, Chavez created a new role, above the office of the mayor in the city's institutional hierarchy, and stripped the mayor of budget and all powers of his office, rendering electoral results and local democracy meaningless. The power to create such roles, and name totally subservient appointees, was proposed by Chavez in a constitutional amendment put to vote in 2007. It was roundly rejected by the public in the 2007 referendum, but since then, the lame duck congress has made sure to grant Chavez enough power to push through undemocratic reforms without consultation, in violation of electoral results.
In its last days, the chavista congress has rushed through legislation to:
· criminalise freedom of expression and dissent in congress;
· control internet and silence the media;
· block funding to NGOs;
· assault universities' independence -where Chavez is yet to win his first election;
· transfer city halls, governorships, congress, public prosecution, economic planning powers and budgets to Chavez's communes.
It must be borne in mind that this is being done after the election of a new, more representative congress, and in addition to the power to rule by decree for the following 18 months. In conclusion, Venezuela can no longer be called a democracy for one simple reason: actions of the dictator in charge prove otherwise.
10 December 2010
A un año de su detención arbitraria, Amnistía Internacional reitera el pedido de liberación de la Jueza Afiuni
Amnistía Internacional considera que la detención de la jueza María Lourdes Afiuni Mora el pasado 10 de diciembre de 2009 es un caso de indebida interferencia política por parte del ejecutivo. Su detención vulnera los Principios Básicos de la ONU relativos a la Independencia del Poder Judicial, adoptados en 1985, que determinan que “[l]os jueces resolverán los asuntos que conozcan con imparcialidad...sin restricción alguna y sin influencias, alicientes, presiones, amenazas o intromisiones indebidas, sean directas o indirectas, de cualquiera sectores o por cualquier motivo”.
La jueza Afiuni ha sido acusada de “corrupción propia, abuso de autoridad, favorecimiento para la evasión y asociación para delinquir”. Su detención se produjo horas después de haber emitido una orden de libertad condicional a favor del banquero Eligio Cedeño. Decisión que se encontraría dentro de su competencia y se ajustaría a las leyes venezolanas que establecen que nadie puede estar detenido a la espera de juicio más de dos años.
La orden de libertad condicional dictada por la jueza en diciembre de 2009 fue condenada públicamente por el Presidente del Gobierno Hugo Chávez. Un año después, Fiscalía General de la República no habría presentado ninguna prueba fehaciente para sustentar los cargos en contra de la jueza Afiuni.
Amnistía Internacional se encuentra profundamente preocupada por las consecuencias que este caso pudiera tener en la disposición que puedan tener las y los jueces de Venezuela a extender a todas las categorías de procesados, los beneficios y salvaguardas contempladas en la constitución y las leyes de Venezuela, asi como en los convenios internacionales de los cuales Venezuela es parte. El temor de las y los jueces a la falta de aceptación de sus decisiones por parte del Ejecutivo y otras instancias del Estado venezolano y las posibles consecuencias que esto podría acarrear, podría afectar la realización de los derechos humanos de la población y la capacidad de los procesados, víctimas y familiares de posibles abusos a los derechos humanos, a obtener justicia y reparación bajo claras normativas preestablecidas.
El Grupo de Trabajo sobre la Detención Arbitraria, la Relatora especial sobre la independencia de magistrados y abogados, y la Relatora especial sobre la situación de los defensores de los derechos humanos, han insistido que “se ponga a la Jueza Afiuni en libertad inmediata e incondicional” y que “[l]as represalias por ejercer funciones constitucionalmente garantizadas y la creación de un clima de temor en el poder judicial y en los abogados no sirve a otro propósito que el de socavar el estado de derecho y obstruir la justicia”, en palabras de estas instancias de Naciones Unidas del 16 de diciembre de 2009.
Preocupa asimismo a Amnistía Internacional que la encarcelación preventiva de la jueza Afiuni en instalaciones en las que se encuentran reas que habrían sido condenadas por ella, pondría a la magistrada en situación de riesgo, y constituiría un castigo cruel, inhumano y degradante, por el prolongado temor a sufrir lesiones graves o muerte. Temor fundamentado por las constantes amenazas e intentos de atentar contra su integridad física, que hasta la fecha habría denunciado la jueza y que al parecer, continúan sin ser debidamente investigados; así como por la situación de violencia generalizada en las prisiones del país, la cual ha ameritado repetidas medidas de protección dictadas por la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos.
Además, de acuerdo a la información recibida, la jueza Afiuni tiene diversos problemas de salud que requieren medicación y atención médica que incluye pruebas ginecológicas y oncológicas; y en más de una ocasión se le habría negado acceso a atención médica adecuada.
AMNISTÍA INTERNACIONAL EXHORTA A LAS AUTORIDADES VENEZOLANAS A:
- Liberar a la jueza Afiuni y asegurar de forma inequívoca y públicamente su respeto a la labor de los operadores de justicia y su compromiso a respetar y garantizar la independencia del poder judicial.
INFORMACION ADICIONAL
La jueza 31 de Control del Área Metropolitana de Caracas, María Lourdes Afiuni Mora, se encuentra detenida desde el 10 de diciembre de 2009. Su detención se produjo horas después de que ordenara la liberación condicional de Eligio Cedeño, un banquero acusado de corrupción que se encontraba detenido a la espera de juicio desde hacia dos años y diez meses, en violación de la ley venezolana que establece que la detención preventiva no debe exceder los dos años. La jueza dictó juicio en libertad para Eligio Cedeño acordando su prohibición de salida del país, presentación ante el tribunal cada 15 días y retención del pasaporte. Al parecer, en su decisión tuvo en cuenta la opinión del Grupo de trabajo sobre detenciones arbitrarias de la ONU que el 1 de septiembre de 2009 indico que la detención de Eligio Cedeño era arbitraria al haberse vulnerado el derecho del acusado a un debido proceso, en particular su derecho a ser juzgado en un plazo razonable o a ser puesto en libertad. El Grupo de trabajo basó su decisión en que el juicio ha[bía] estado paralizado largo tiempo sin que el Gobierno h[ubiera] justificado tal dilación” y en la “larguísima detención preventiva”.
El mismo día en que la jueza Afiuni fuera detenida, Eligio Cedeño viajó a los Estados Unidos donde se encuentra actualmente en libertad a la espera de una decisión sobre su solicitud de asilo político. El 22 de Abril de 2010 el gobierno venezolano solicitó su extradición.
La jueza Afiuni ha sido acusada de “corrupción propia, abuso de autoridad, favorecimiento para la evasión y asociación para delinquir”, cargos que conllevan penas de entre cinco y ocho años de prisión. La acusación en su contra se produjo el 11 de diciembre de 2009, el mismo día que el Presidente Hugo Chávez realizara las siguientes declaraciones en un programa de televisión y radio en el que se encontraba presente la Fiscal General: “Bueno, está presa y yo exijo dureza contra esa jueza incluso le dije a la presidenta del Tribunal Suprema de Justicia [Luisa Estela Morales]... y así lo digo a la Asamblea Nacional, habrá que hacer una ley porque es mucho, mucho más grave un juez que libere a un bandido, que el bandido mismo... habrá que meterle pena máxima...treinta años de prisión pido yo, por la dignidad del país”. “Yo pido que se le aplique todo el peso de la ley...yo pido pena máxima para jueces que se presten a vagabunderías como esta... y no en una oficina por ahí, donde debe estar es en una prisión”.
La jueza Afiuni se encuentra recluida hasta la fecha en el Instituto Nacional de Orientación Femenina, Los Teques, Estado de Miranda. Su defensa habría apelado en dos ocasiones la decisión de mantenerla en prisión a la espera de juicio. En ambos casos, la apelación fue negada.
24 November 2010
Miente Piedad Cordoba
Piedad Córdoba, la ex senadora colombiana que ha hecho carrera como apóloga de los narco terroristas de las FARC, anda diciendo que nunca recibió dinero de Hugo Chavez. El recuadro que acompaña estas lineas demuestra que Piedad Córdoba está mintiendo. La información proviene del Departamento de Justicia de los EEUU (pag. 23 en el documento), de la oficina de registro de agentes foráneos (FARA en inglés). Se refiere a las actividades de cabildeo de Olivia Goumbri, en su caracter de directora de la Venezuela Information Office, quien estuvo haciendo una serie de contactos con congresistas estadounidenses para que recibieran a Piedad Córdoba en una visita a Washington.
¿Por qué una empleada de la Venezuela Information Office, devengando un salario pagado con dinero proveniente de Venezuela, le cuadra citas a la senadora colombiana Piedad Córdoba en Washington? La misma Piedad Córdoba había admitido anteriormente haber viajado a EEUU "invitada por la embajada de Venezuela." ¿Cómo es ese cuento entonces, de que ella nunca ha recibido dinero de Venezuela?
Cuando descubrí la información de la relación de la Venezuela Information Office con la visita de Córdoba a Washington, en octubre del 2009, se la envié al embajador de Colombia aqui en Londres. La evidencia del apoyo de Venezuela a Piedad Córdoba es pública. Sólo queda esperar que la justicia colombiana actúe debidamente.
El discurso de Eva Golinger
Horror. Asco. Sorpresa. Arrechera. Vergüenza. Pena. Odio. Venganza... Sentimientos que definen lo que la Venezuela no chavista -que es mayoría- sintió ayer cuando vió, o escuchó, a la norteamericana Eva Golinger dirigirse al pais en cadena nacional, desde una asamblea nacional copada de los más altos personeros del chavismo, incluido el lider supremo. Golinger ha llegado al olimpo revolucionario. No cabe duda.
Admito que no me extrañó su discurso, o que se le haya dado tal tribuna. No abrigo ninguno de los sentimientos mencionados. Dirán que estoy loco. Ido. Desconectado. Ya lo sé. Me permito decir sin embargo, que no se puede esperar otra cosa de una asamblea dirigida por un personaje tan deficiente como Cilia Flores. No se puede esperar otra cosa, cuando el líder supremo es Hugo Chavez, por cuanto Chavez, quien demuestra el más absoluto desprecio por el criterio individual, sólo puede ser líder supremo entre deficientes. Ultimadamente, un dizque líder supremo que sigue al pie de la letra las ordenes de Fidel Castro ni siquiera merece llamarse líder.
Por ello, no hay que arrecharse. Como se dice en inglés "let's keep the eye on the ball", es decir, no perdamos de vista el objetivo, que no es otro que el rescate de nuestro país en el 2012. Dejemos que los deficientes sigan vitoreando a su lider, que sigan ovacionando en pie, que sigan demostrando su fervor y fanatismo revolucionarios. Es más, unamonos al coro aclamador, aupemos a los deficientes, clamemos por más promociones de colaboradores de las FARC a dirigir la Fuerza Armada Nacional, por más naturalizaciones de terroristas de ETA, por más apoyo y cobertura a los apólogos foráneos. Debemos coadyuvar a convertir este espacio de tiempo que nos separa del 2012 en la fiesta inolvidable del chavismo. Para que al concluir no quepa la menor duda, que el único lugar apto para los deficientes es la cárcel, el psiquiátrico, o el exilio.
Los que estaban en la asamblea ayer no representan a Venezuela. Son minoría. Saben que les queda poco tiempo, y precisamente por que lo saben aceleran su radicalización, ya que sólo así podrán mantenerse en el poder. Chavez necesita a Golinger, y a Rangel Silva, y a Cilia Flores, y a Isaias Rodriguez, y a Jorge Rodriguez, y a Arturo Cubillas, y a Andres Izarra... es decir Chavez necesita, más que nunca, a los incondicionales, a los que están dispuestos a empeñar su futuro y su libertad. Pero, ¿cuántos son, 50, 100, 1.000? ¿Cuántos están verdaderamente dispuestos a seguir al pie de la letra el cántico "Patria, Socialismo..." y morir por Chavez? Sabemos que el propio caudillo no arriesga el pellejo por nadie, por ello Manuel Caballero lo llama el "Héroe del Museo Militar." Lo cojonudo del asunto es que los deficientes también lo saben, y créanme cuando les digo que todas esas demostraciones fundamentalistas son pura paja.
Vendrán más provocaciones, más peines, más trapos rojos. No importa. No debe importar. Nuestro objetivo sigue siendo rescatar a Venezuela de manos del crimen organizado y el terrorismo.
Somos mayoría. Somos decencia. Somos el futuro de Venezuela. Venezuela necesita gente recta, firme, unida en torno a ideales de justicia, libertad y democracia.
Admito que no me extrañó su discurso, o que se le haya dado tal tribuna. No abrigo ninguno de los sentimientos mencionados. Dirán que estoy loco. Ido. Desconectado. Ya lo sé. Me permito decir sin embargo, que no se puede esperar otra cosa de una asamblea dirigida por un personaje tan deficiente como Cilia Flores. No se puede esperar otra cosa, cuando el líder supremo es Hugo Chavez, por cuanto Chavez, quien demuestra el más absoluto desprecio por el criterio individual, sólo puede ser líder supremo entre deficientes. Ultimadamente, un dizque líder supremo que sigue al pie de la letra las ordenes de Fidel Castro ni siquiera merece llamarse líder.
Por ello, no hay que arrecharse. Como se dice en inglés "let's keep the eye on the ball", es decir, no perdamos de vista el objetivo, que no es otro que el rescate de nuestro país en el 2012. Dejemos que los deficientes sigan vitoreando a su lider, que sigan ovacionando en pie, que sigan demostrando su fervor y fanatismo revolucionarios. Es más, unamonos al coro aclamador, aupemos a los deficientes, clamemos por más promociones de colaboradores de las FARC a dirigir la Fuerza Armada Nacional, por más naturalizaciones de terroristas de ETA, por más apoyo y cobertura a los apólogos foráneos. Debemos coadyuvar a convertir este espacio de tiempo que nos separa del 2012 en la fiesta inolvidable del chavismo. Para que al concluir no quepa la menor duda, que el único lugar apto para los deficientes es la cárcel, el psiquiátrico, o el exilio.
Los que estaban en la asamblea ayer no representan a Venezuela. Son minoría. Saben que les queda poco tiempo, y precisamente por que lo saben aceleran su radicalización, ya que sólo así podrán mantenerse en el poder. Chavez necesita a Golinger, y a Rangel Silva, y a Cilia Flores, y a Isaias Rodriguez, y a Jorge Rodriguez, y a Arturo Cubillas, y a Andres Izarra... es decir Chavez necesita, más que nunca, a los incondicionales, a los que están dispuestos a empeñar su futuro y su libertad. Pero, ¿cuántos son, 50, 100, 1.000? ¿Cuántos están verdaderamente dispuestos a seguir al pie de la letra el cántico "Patria, Socialismo..." y morir por Chavez? Sabemos que el propio caudillo no arriesga el pellejo por nadie, por ello Manuel Caballero lo llama el "Héroe del Museo Militar." Lo cojonudo del asunto es que los deficientes también lo saben, y créanme cuando les digo que todas esas demostraciones fundamentalistas son pura paja.
Vendrán más provocaciones, más peines, más trapos rojos. No importa. No debe importar. Nuestro objetivo sigue siendo rescatar a Venezuela de manos del crimen organizado y el terrorismo.
Somos mayoría. Somos decencia. Somos el futuro de Venezuela. Venezuela necesita gente recta, firme, unida en torno a ideales de justicia, libertad y democracia.
27 October 2010
Tomas Sanchez, Superintendente Nacional de Valores de Venezuela, al frente de grupo de extorsion.
Al parecer el bureau de investigaciones federales de los EEUU (FBI) ha estado siguiendo las actividades de funcionarios de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Venezuela, específicamente las de un tal Rafael Ramos. Ramos, quien fue designado como interventor de UnoValores Casa de Bolsa, el 26 de febrero de 2010 por Tomas Sanchez, Superintendente Nacional de Valores (según Gaceta Oficial numero 39.375), acaba de ser arrestado por el FBI en Miami, por estar involucrado en un intento de extorsión.
Tomas Sanchez, jefe de Ramos, y quien se presume es el capo de los extorsionadores que hacen vida en la Comisión Nacional de Valores, acaba de salir al paso de lo que le sobreviene ante la justicia americana, denunciando dizque intentos de involucrar al régimen de Hugo Chavez en este caso de extorsión. Sanchez llega al punto de afirmar que Ramos no es funcionario publico, a pesar de que él mismo firmó el acto publicado en Gaceta Oficial número 39.375 ya mencionado. De hecho, una búsqueda en Google por Rafael Ramos, en el portal de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Venezuela, demuestra que Ramos ha sido designado como interventor por Sanchez en numerosas ocasiones.
Fuentes expertas en el tema informan desde Venezuela que los interventores designados por Sanchez llegan, se asignan sueldo, y contratan personal, a expensas de las empresas intervenidas. Indagan sobre bienes muebles, vehículos, etc., los cuales, de ser del agrado de los 'interventores', son lo primero que confiscan. Se han intervenido 45 casas de bolsa en Venezuela. Familiares de Ramos han participado en intervenciones de casas de bolsa y entidades financieras.
Econoinvest, cuyo valor estimado rondaba los 100 millones de dólares, esta siendo liquidado, sin ningun tipo de recurso legal. Unovalores Casa de Bolsa está intervenida desde Enero. Ahora resulta que su dueño estaba siendo extorsionado por Sanchez y Ramos.
De las 45 entidades intervenidas por la Comisión Nacional de Valores, solo una, GlobalCorp, para cuya intervención también se designó a Ramos, ha logrado resolver la situación. En procesos de intervención, la Comisión Nacional de Valores se ha negado a responder recursos legales presentados por las partes interesadas. La detención de Ramos en Florida, por extorsión, demuestra que no es precisamente la aplicación de la ley la premisa que priva en casos de intervención a entidades financieras por parte de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Venezuela.
Tomas Sanchez, jefe de Ramos, y quien se presume es el capo de los extorsionadores que hacen vida en la Comisión Nacional de Valores, acaba de salir al paso de lo que le sobreviene ante la justicia americana, denunciando dizque intentos de involucrar al régimen de Hugo Chavez en este caso de extorsión. Sanchez llega al punto de afirmar que Ramos no es funcionario publico, a pesar de que él mismo firmó el acto publicado en Gaceta Oficial número 39.375 ya mencionado. De hecho, una búsqueda en Google por Rafael Ramos, en el portal de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Venezuela, demuestra que Ramos ha sido designado como interventor por Sanchez en numerosas ocasiones.
Fuentes expertas en el tema informan desde Venezuela que los interventores designados por Sanchez llegan, se asignan sueldo, y contratan personal, a expensas de las empresas intervenidas. Indagan sobre bienes muebles, vehículos, etc., los cuales, de ser del agrado de los 'interventores', son lo primero que confiscan. Se han intervenido 45 casas de bolsa en Venezuela. Familiares de Ramos han participado en intervenciones de casas de bolsa y entidades financieras.
Econoinvest, cuyo valor estimado rondaba los 100 millones de dólares, esta siendo liquidado, sin ningun tipo de recurso legal. Unovalores Casa de Bolsa está intervenida desde Enero. Ahora resulta que su dueño estaba siendo extorsionado por Sanchez y Ramos.
De las 45 entidades intervenidas por la Comisión Nacional de Valores, solo una, GlobalCorp, para cuya intervención también se designó a Ramos, ha logrado resolver la situación. En procesos de intervención, la Comisión Nacional de Valores se ha negado a responder recursos legales presentados por las partes interesadas. La detención de Ramos en Florida, por extorsión, demuestra que no es precisamente la aplicación de la ley la premisa que priva en casos de intervención a entidades financieras por parte de la Comisión Nacional de Valores de Venezuela.
12 October 2010
Etarra Arturo Cubillas utiliza numero de cédula falso en solicitud de investigación a la fiscalía de Venezuela
Esto se cuenta y no se cree. Arturo Cubillas, sindicado de estar implicado en actos terroristas como miembro de ETA, por el Juez de la Audiencia Nacional de España Eloy Velasco, se presentó hoy en la oficinas de la fiscalía de Venezuela, a pedir se le investigue. La solicitud de Cubillas puede verse en El Nacional, y en Noticias24. Es básicamente un refrito de las insultantes declaraciones del embajador de Chavez en España, quien sugirió que los dos etarras detenidos recientemente, y que declararon haber recibido entrenamiento en campos terroristas en Venezuela, lo hicieron bajo tortura. Uno de los números de cédula que Cubillas utiliza en su escrito legal a la fiscalía es falso y no se corresponde con el suyo. Como puede observarse en las imágenes, los numeros de cedula utilizados por Cubillas simplemente no coinciden.
Pero lo mas repulsivo del caso no es que el etarra Cubillas incluya información falsa en su solicitud a la fiscalía chavista, ni que exprese que su dizque dignidad ha sido mancillada, si no el hecho de que Marino Alvarado, abogado defensor de los derechos humanos y dirigente de PROVEA, haya tenido la desfachatez de afirmar que él esta 100% convencido de la inocencia de Cubillas. Es decir antes de que jueces competentes establezcan responsabilidades, ya el Sr. Alvarado esta convencido de que Cubillas es un santo. En la misma entrevista, Alvarado, al parecer ahora abogado defensor de Cubillas, dice saber qué ha hecho el etarra desde que llegó a Venezuela en 1988, aun cuando afirma desconocer el cargo que ocupa Cubillas en el Ministerio de Agricultura y Tierras de la administración de Hugo Chavez. En qué quedamos entonces?
Desde luego que esta farsa es una burla, una broma de pésimo gusto, y un insulto a las víctimas del terrorismo. El que ningún periodista de los medios citados se haya dado cuenta, hasta el momento de escribir estas lineas, de la discrepancia en los números de cédula identidad utilizados no es tan grave, como las afirmaciones de un abogado de derechos humanos devenido en una suerte de juez de conciencia y acción de un individuo involucrado en la comisión de delitos de terrorismo.
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| Nótese numero de cédula: V-22.646.822 |
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| Nótese numero de cédula: V-22.646.830 |
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| V-22.646.822 |
Cómo puede explicarse esta situación? Si Alvarado conoce tanto a Cubillas, le acompañó a la fiscalía, y, presumiblemente, le asesora legalmente, cómo es posible que no se haya dado cuenta de las diferencias en una solicitud de tan sólo 3 páginas? Cómo puede Alvarado estar tan convenido de la inocencia de Cubillas, o dicho de otro modo, qué sabe Alvarado que desconoce el juez Eloy Velasco? En la Venezuela chavista, la fiscalía no va a investigar nada. El poder judicial se encuentra absolutamente parcializado, y esta bajo el control de Chavez. Eso lo sabe Marino Alvarado, quien se ha expresado públicamente al respecto.
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| V-22.646.830 |
28 September 2010
Carta abierta a Socorro Hernández
Querida Socorro,
Con curiosidad leímos tus declaraciones del día de hoy, en las que dices, con la precisión de un reloj suizo, que las circunscripciones electorales fueron diseñadas por un “método” basado en la “ley.”
¿Cuál es ese “método” Socorro?
Los únicos estados donde hubo modificaciones fueron Zulia, Distrito Capital, Miranda, Carabobo, Amazonas, Barinas, Lara y Táchira. Qué casualidad que siete de estos ocho estados son bastiones de la oposición, y el otro (Barinas) es el estado natal del Presidente. Cosas de la matemática, dirás.
Pero dinos, ¿será posible que compartas con nosotros la mágica fórmula matemática – “el método”, como lo llamas tú - que dio ese maravilloso resultado? No seas pichirre, vale.
Si tienes un “método” exacto que obliga a unir Baruta con Chacao y Leoncio Martínez, ¿acaso no es un crimen tenerlo guardado bajo llave?
Debe ser fascinante ese “método” que los llevó a dividir el Municipio Sucre del Estado Miranda en tres partes – dos partes en las que tradicionalmente gana la oposición, y otra en la que gana el gobierno y que fue anexada a Guarenas.
Debe ser muy sabio ese “método” que unió las parroquias de El Paraíso y La Vega del Distrito Capital – en las que la oposición salió relativamente bien - con las parroquias de Antímano y Macarao, donde el chavismo nos da palo.
Ese método debe ser tan sofisticado que por eso nadie lo entiende. ¿Será por eso que tu colega Vicente Díaz dijo en enero del 2010 que no existían criterios técnicos para los cambios? ¿No crees que ese “método” quiere ver la luz del día? ¿Acaso no merece tu “método” salir del closet?
Mira, Socorro, nosotros no somos sino unos simples ciudadanos blogueros. No tenemos a la mano la fuerza del aparato del Estado, ni comandamos el Plan República. No tenemos las armas tecnológicas, financieras, ni matemáticas que ustedes, los poderosos, sí tienen.
Lo único que sí tenemos – por ahora, ¿verdad? – es nuestra voz y el artículo 186 de la Constitución, que dice que la representación en la Asamblea deberá ser proporcional.
Y por eso te invitamos a discutir tu “método” con nosotros, donde quieras y cuando quieras. Trae tu fórmula, y nosotros traemos nuestros estudios que, modestia aparte, creemos son bastante serios. Trae tu “modelo” y nosotros traeremos las predicciones y pronósticos que hicimos y que lograron predecir el resultado de la elección.
Porque si es verdad que el “método” no favorece a nadie en particular, no deberías tener problema en debatirlo con nosotros. Si tu “método” es como lo pintas, te lo reconoceríamos sin dudar.
Es más, si nos convences, te hacemos tronco de publicidad. Como nuestro trabajo ha sido citado por The Guardian, The Economist, la BBC, Reuters, y otros medios internacionales, capaz y hasta te ayudamos a revertir esa “matriz de opinión” contraria al CNE que también hoy denunciaste.
Sería sólo un simple debate entre compatriotas. Democracia pura, pues.
Entonces Socorro, ¿te anotas?
Los autores de
www.caracaschronicles.com
www.devilsexcrement.com
http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com
http://alekboyd.blogspot.com
Con curiosidad leímos tus declaraciones del día de hoy, en las que dices, con la precisión de un reloj suizo, que las circunscripciones electorales fueron diseñadas por un “método” basado en la “ley.”
¿Cuál es ese “método” Socorro?
Los únicos estados donde hubo modificaciones fueron Zulia, Distrito Capital, Miranda, Carabobo, Amazonas, Barinas, Lara y Táchira. Qué casualidad que siete de estos ocho estados son bastiones de la oposición, y el otro (Barinas) es el estado natal del Presidente. Cosas de la matemática, dirás.
Pero dinos, ¿será posible que compartas con nosotros la mágica fórmula matemática – “el método”, como lo llamas tú - que dio ese maravilloso resultado? No seas pichirre, vale.
Si tienes un “método” exacto que obliga a unir Baruta con Chacao y Leoncio Martínez, ¿acaso no es un crimen tenerlo guardado bajo llave?
Debe ser fascinante ese “método” que los llevó a dividir el Municipio Sucre del Estado Miranda en tres partes – dos partes en las que tradicionalmente gana la oposición, y otra en la que gana el gobierno y que fue anexada a Guarenas.
Debe ser muy sabio ese “método” que unió las parroquias de El Paraíso y La Vega del Distrito Capital – en las que la oposición salió relativamente bien - con las parroquias de Antímano y Macarao, donde el chavismo nos da palo.
Ese método debe ser tan sofisticado que por eso nadie lo entiende. ¿Será por eso que tu colega Vicente Díaz dijo en enero del 2010 que no existían criterios técnicos para los cambios? ¿No crees que ese “método” quiere ver la luz del día? ¿Acaso no merece tu “método” salir del closet?
Mira, Socorro, nosotros no somos sino unos simples ciudadanos blogueros. No tenemos a la mano la fuerza del aparato del Estado, ni comandamos el Plan República. No tenemos las armas tecnológicas, financieras, ni matemáticas que ustedes, los poderosos, sí tienen.
Lo único que sí tenemos – por ahora, ¿verdad? – es nuestra voz y el artículo 186 de la Constitución, que dice que la representación en la Asamblea deberá ser proporcional.
Y por eso te invitamos a discutir tu “método” con nosotros, donde quieras y cuando quieras. Trae tu fórmula, y nosotros traemos nuestros estudios que, modestia aparte, creemos son bastante serios. Trae tu “modelo” y nosotros traeremos las predicciones y pronósticos que hicimos y que lograron predecir el resultado de la elección.
Porque si es verdad que el “método” no favorece a nadie en particular, no deberías tener problema en debatirlo con nosotros. Si tu “método” es como lo pintas, te lo reconoceríamos sin dudar.
Es más, si nos convences, te hacemos tronco de publicidad. Como nuestro trabajo ha sido citado por The Guardian, The Economist, la BBC, Reuters, y otros medios internacionales, capaz y hasta te ayudamos a revertir esa “matriz de opinión” contraria al CNE que también hoy denunciaste.
Sería sólo un simple debate entre compatriotas. Democracia pura, pues.
Entonces Socorro, ¿te anotas?
Los autores de
www.caracaschronicles.com
www.devilsexcrement.com
http://daniel-venezuela.blogspot.com
http://alekboyd.blogspot.com
18 September 2010
Qué pasa si la oposición gana la asamblea en Venezuela?
Mi esposa, quien aunque sigue los acontecimientos políticos de nuestro país desde saludable distancia no deja de estar al tanto, me preguntó en estos días: "¿Y qué pasa si la oposición gana las elecciones de la asamblea?" La pregunta me dejó en silencio, por cuanto me he acostumbrado a pensar siempre en la parte negativa, es decir, en cómo las componendas de Chavez y su ministerio electoral asegurarán la continuidad revolucionaria, y por ende su permanencia en el poder, sin importar mucho la expresión del pueblo a través de las urnas.
Algunos concluirán, "¿Y por qué tanta negatividad en cuanto a nuestras posibilidades?" Al respecto responderé que, desde el referendo revocatorio del 2004, el chavismo logró que germinara, al menos en mi, la duda sobre los resultados de todos los procesos electorales. Y ahora paso a exponer mis motivos:
Algunos concluirán, "¿Y por qué tanta negatividad en cuanto a nuestras posibilidades?" Al respecto responderé que, desde el referendo revocatorio del 2004, el chavismo logró que germinara, al menos en mi, la duda sobre los resultados de todos los procesos electorales. Y ahora paso a exponer mis motivos:
- 2004: Luego de muchos meses de participación en la mesa de negociación, los representantes de la coordinadora democrática, chavismo, y observadores internacionales llegaron a un acuerdo sobre la resolución de la grave crisis política de Venezuela. La vía electoral seria la acordada entre los actores, en un marco de respeto a la constitución y leyes de la república, y demás instrumentos legales internacionales. Todo ello se fue al traste, cuando el CNE de Carrasquero y Rodriguez torpedearon todos y cada uno de los esfuerzos que habían sido acordados entre las partes. ¿Cómo olvidar aquella rueda de prensa, en la cual el Secretario General de la OEA, Cesar Gaviria, desmintió públicamente al director del Centro Carter, Jimmy Carter, cuando éste afirmó que observadores internacionales habían sido testigos del recuento final en la sala de totalización del CNE? A mi desde luego que no se me olvida, ni tampoco se me olvida la irresponsabilidad de los observadores internacionales, al respaldar unos resultados que no habían podido validar por las obstrucciones, ilegales por demás, del CNE. Posteriormente, trabajos de investigación de reputados académicos venezolanos demostrarían la improbabilidad de los resultados anunciados entre gallos y media noche. Pero ya el mal estaba hecho, y Chavez a sus anchas.
- 2005: elecciones legislativas. Un técnico venezolano, llamado Leopoldo Gonzalez, demuestra en una votación ficticia celebrada el 23 de Noviembre ante observadores internacionales en Fila de Mariches, que las maquinitas de lotería devenidas en consorcio de fraude electoral multinacional mantienen la secuencia del voto, y por tanto el secreto del voto está comprometido. La oposición se retiraría en masa de esas elecciones, dejando el campo desierto. Mucho se ha cuestionado dicha decisión durante los últimos 5 años. Pero, ¿cómo participar a sabiendas que el sistema es fraudulento?
- 2006: el destino quiso que me adentrase de lleno en la campaña presidencial, durante la cual fui testigo de muchas cosas, ignoradas por la mayoría de la gente. El haber sido miembro del grupo más cercano de colaboradores de Manuel Rosales me permitió, entre otras cosas, enterarme de que la oposición no tuvo testigos en 40% de las mesas a nivel nacional. Eso son 12.000 mesas aproximadamente, o llamandolo de otra forma, 12.000 oportunidades para que los chavistas votaran por ellos, y por todos los que aparecen inscritos en el cuaderno electoral, sin ser vistos por miembros de la oposición. Es la Venezuela rural, la que nadie conoce en Chacao o Petare, o en los platós de television. No me consta que los 7 millones de votos que sacó Chavez fueron obtenidos de forma fraudulenta, pero, y he aquí el punto, tampoco me consta lo contrario.
- 2007: primer referendo de enmienda constitucional. Que si los estudiantes, que si RCTV, que si el Chavez admite derrotas democráticas... Dos cosas de suma importancia para mi. La primera: Chavez no perdió, en mi opinión, ni por los estudiantes, ni sus marchas, ni por RCTV. No. Chavez perdió, por que 3 millones de chavistas, de los supuestos 7 millones que dizque habrían votado por él en el 2006, decidieron quedarse en su casa, y no votar. Chavez perdió por que su primera enmienda dejaba por fuera a todos, inclusive a los chavistas. Chavez perdió por que quiso coronarse monarca, y adjudicarse poder absoluto. Poder para nombrar autoridades a dedo por encima de resultados electorales. Poder para mantener a las fuerzas armadas chequeadas con milicias bolivarianas, armadas, financiadas, y dependientes únicamente de él. Poder para rediseñar unilateralmente la distribución geográfica, institucional y política del Estado. En suma, Chavez se fue de palos, y los leguleyos que normalmente lo apoyan vieron sus cabezas en peligro, y los empleados públicos, que no olvidemos son millones, y los militares, sencillamente, no se prestaron, no sacaron a la gente a votar, ni repartieron el realero que normalmente reparten durante las campañas. Ademas de esto, por cosas del destino, me tope en un viaje a Caracas con Raul Baduel, el mismo que devolvió a Chavez al poder en el 2002. Y éste me hizo un comentario que vino a corroborar lo que muchos pensábamos: en la sede del CUFAN hay monitores que permiten ver en tiempo real el desarrollo de los procesos de votación. Los resultados reflejados en esos monitores permitieron a Baduel comenzar a comunicarse con Tibisay Lucena desde la 1pm del domingo de votación, para decirle que la tendencia era indudablemente a la perdida, y que los militares no permitirían un fraude.
- 2008: Chavez pierde Petare, y Caracas, y Zulia. Que alguien me diga que lo que Chavez le ha hecho a Ocariz, y, sobre todo, a Antonio Ledezma, es conducta de un demócrata, o de alguien que respeta los resultados electorales. Pasó su segunda enmienda, pero eso si, ésta vez se cuidó de repartir bien la cochina, y por ello las focas hicieron su trabajo.
Con base en lo anterior, entre otras cosas, le respondí a mi esposa:
"¿Qué pasa si la oposición gana la asamblea? En un país democrático, la asamblea es el lugar donde los representantes del pueblo, escogidos en elecciones libres, deciden sobre todos los asuntos que rigen al Estado. Ello significa, que la asamblea, toda vez que se cumplan las mayorías exigidas por ley, puede:
- anular todos los actos, legislaciones, decretos, asignaciones, designaciones, proyectos, y demás acciones violatorias de la constitución del régimen de Chavez, de acuerdo a su artículo número 25.
- Destituir a todos los jueces del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, y nombrar jueces nuevos. Lo mismo aplica a todo el sistema de justicia.
- Destituir al directorio del Consejo Nacional Electoral, y nombrar uno nuevo.
- Enmendar la Ley Orgánica del Sufragio y Participación Politica e introducir la obligatoriedad de realizar elecciones manuales en Venezuela.
- Convocar una asamblea nacional constituyente y refundar el estado.
- Designar comisiones para investigar todas las acciones que podrian considerarse violatorias de la constitución, hechas por el régimen de Chavez.
- Abrirle averiguaciones a Hugo Chavez, y, de ser responsable de violaciones a la constitución y las leyes, declararlo incompetente para el cargo que detenta, y destituirlo. Lo mismo puede hacerse con todos los funcionarios públicos de jerarquía del régimen.
- Redireccionar el presupuesto del Estado, revisar y enmendar el actual.
- Pasar legislaciones tendientes a descentralizar el Estado.
- Suspender relaciones con otros países consideradas como lesivas para Venezuela...
Hice un alto, me di cuenta de que me estaba dejando llevar, y de que mi respuesta nada tenia que ver con la realidad, sino con un estado utópico que no puede existir sino en divagaciones en la Venezuela actual. Retome mi respuesta:
"Claro, todo eso puede pasar en un país democrático. Es decir, si Chavez pierde el control de la asamblea eso será el principio de su fin. Ahora bien, ¿qué posibilidad hay, en realidad, de que esas cosas sucedan? ¿Qué posibilidad existe de que Chavez, sabiendo que todo lo anterior puede suceder y que puede terminar con sus huesos en la cárcel, permita que la oposición gane la asamblea? Ninguna mi amor."
26 July 2010
Larry Rohter does Mark Weisbrot et al
From History News Network. No further comments needed...
Oliver Stone Still Doesn't Get It
By Larry Rohter
Larry Rohter is a graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, where he majored in history, economics and political science, and also has a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International Affairs, where he specialized in Modern Chinese History and Politics. From 1977 to 2008 he was primarily a foreign correspondent in Latin America and Asia, first for Newsweek and then for The New York Times, where he is now a culture reporter. He is the author of “Deu no New York Times” (2008: Objetiva), a Portuguese-language best-seller in Brazil, and “Brazil on the Rise,” which will be published September 1 by Palgrave Macmillan.
One month ago, I incurred the wrath of Oliver Stone for stating the obvious in an article I wrote: his new movie South of the Border, ostensibly a “documentary” about Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and a group of supposedly like-minded South American colleagues, is so riddled with errors, misrepresentations, fabrications and fraudulent statistics as to be useless except as an example of over-the-top propaganda. At the screening for the movie that I attended, I counted more than two dozen assertions that are demonstrably incorrect, but chose, in the limited space available to me, to focus on but a handful.
Stone’s response wasn’t long in coming. Though he had acknowledged and apologized for several of his mistakes in a pair of interviews I did with him before writing my fact-checking article, he changed course as soon as the piece appeared, circulating an attempt at a rebuttal while also launching a smear campaign against me and my work with the assistance of sympathetic pro-Chavez solidarity groups and websites. To hear them tell it, I am a CIA agent, coup supporter, racist, coup denier, “tool of the corporate media,” reactionary and defender of rapacious multinational companies. One “solidarity” website went so far as to suggest I be assassinated, and I suppose that if I had looked hard enough, I would even have found myself accused of beating my wife.
All of this is nonsense, of course, a diversionary tactic meant to draw attention away from further discussion of the manifold failings of Stone’s film. The same goes for the written claims, full of indisputably false assertions, which Stone and his two screenwriters, Mark Weisbrot and Tariq Ali, have sent to a number of news organizations and websites, including HNN. I don’t intend to test the patience or limited interest of readers with a point-by-point refutation of Stone’s letter here. But it is worthwhile to examine a few of his more egregious errors and specious claims, because they say something about the way he and his associates think and work.
In my original article, for example, I pointed to the film’s erroneous contention that “the United States imports more oil from Venezuela than any other OPEC nation.” In fact, that distinction has long belonged to Saudi Arabia. But rather than admit their error, Stone and especially Weisbrot, who as the principal screenwriter is responsible for the bulk of the most glaring mistakes, have shifted position several times, trying to redefine what years should be taken into account and whether the standard of measurement should be “oil,” as stated in the film, or “petroleum and derivatives,” their fall-back position.
None of this attempted sleight of hand changes the bottom line. No matter how Stone and Weisbrot try to twist the numbers, they continue to be wrong. Here are the official statistics comparing U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, compiled by the U.S. Department of Energy and expressed in thousands of barrels, for every single year since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999:
YEAR S. Arabia Venezuela
1999 506,272 419,893
2000 557,569 447,736
2001 588,075 471,243
2002 554,500 438,270
2003 629,820 431,704
2004 547,125 474,531
2005 527,287 452,914
2006 519,236 417,001
2007 528,189 419,180
2008 550,276 380,419
2009 360,934 352,278
Weisbrot is an economist, not a historian, and apparently not a very good one. Either he is so incompetent that he can’t read a simple table or he is deliberately manipulating the numbers. The latter seems more likely, since reputable economists have chastised him for such lapses in the past. For example, Francisco Rodriguez, a Venezuelan who once was chief economist for the Venezuelan Congress and now teaches at Wesleyan University, has written a scathing paper called “How Not to Defend the Revolution: Mark Weisbrot and the Misinterpretation of Venezuelan Evidence.” In it, he notes that “Weisbrot’s critiques are generally invalid, relying on erroneous reading of the evidence or use of severely biased indicators,” which is exactly the problem here.
In the face of what is uncontestable evidence, Weisbrot is now attempting to argue that his mistake is “irrelevant” or inconsequential. This too is false, for at least two reasons. First of all, this effort to bend, twist and distort irrefutable statistics about oil is indicative of a reckless disregard for the facts that is much broader and, in fact, pervades all of South of the Border. If Stone, Weisbrot and Ali can’t get even the simplest details correct, why should any filmgoer or scholar believe any of their other assertions?
More importantly, the notion of Venezuela as the chief source of OPEC oil for the U.S. is a fundamental building block in one of Stone, Weisbrot and Ali’s larger and more important arguments. In the movie, Hugo Chavez is quoted as follows, speaking of himself in the third person: “The coup against Hugo Chavez had one motive, oil. First, Chavez, oil. Second, Saddam, Iraq.” Stone endorses and furthers this idea by saying onscreen that “the same strategy as Iraq was applied to the upheavals in South America.”
In reality, the reasons for the April 2002 coup that briefly overthrew Chavez remain a matter of intense dispute even now. Opposition groups and Venezuelan military officers contend that they acted because Chavez was making an unconstitutional power grab and may have ordered troops and his own supporters to fire on unarmed protestors. In an effort to shift the focus from that counter-argument and snooker viewers who have not followed the rise, fall and resurrection of Hugo Chavez, Stone and Weisbrot have had to inflate Venezuela’s declining global importance as an oil producer.
A second leg of this same argument is that Chavez incurred the wrath of the United States and the oil industry because under him “the government got control of the oil industry for the first time,” a phrase Stone repeats more than once in the film. This too is false. Venezuela nationalized the oil industry in 1976, when Carlos Andres Perez was president, and folded all foreign-owned companies into a single state-run entity. But Hugo Chavez despises Carlos Andres Perez, who jailed him after Chavez’s failed coup attempt in 1992, and never passes up a chance to undermine his image or attack him. As Chavez’s faithful stenographers, Stone and Weisbrot merely parrot Chavez’s argument, without bothering to check to see if it is true. It is not.
South of the Border is riddled with other errors and misinformation like this, but Stone and Weisbrot refuse to acknowledge them. They continue to insist, for instance, that Chavez’s main opponent in the 1998 election was not Henrique Salas Romer, the former state governor who got 40 percent of the vote, but Irene Saez, the beauty queen who received a mere 3 percent. By that novel and bizarre standard, George Bush’s main opponent in the 2000 election was not Al Gore but Ralph Nader, and Ronald Reagan’s main opponent in the 1980 election was not Jimmy Carter but John Anderson. Their defense is to refer to early 1997, when Chavez and Saez were the only candidates of note. But the election was held in December 1998, not in January 1997, and in any case they never at any time mention Salas Romer, thus conveying to viewers the false impression that the election was from start to finish a contest between “beauty and the beast.” As far as they are concerned, Salas Romer simply doesn’t exist, but hey, never let the facts get in the way of a good story line.
Speaking of Jimmy Carter, it’s worth noting that the non-partisan, international election monitoring commission that he headed issued an official assessment of the 1998 vote that is identical to mine and completely contradicts the characterization Stone, Weisbrot and Ali have concocted in South of the Border. It is ridiculous at this late date that the three of them are trying to rewrite history and challenge an assessment endorsed by all of the participants in the 1998 election, including Hugo Chavez himself. Here is the relevant passage from the Carter Center’s report:
But I’m perfectly willing to have that debate now, because it says something about how Stone, and especially Weisbrot, continually attempt to hoodwink the unwary viewer. In the movie, the image of the cover of a U.S. government document appears briefly on the screen as the April 2002 coup is being discussed. When I asked Weisbrot about that, he said that it was a State Department study in which State acknowledged its “involvement” in the coup. Specifically, he pointed to this passage: “NED (the National Endowment for Democracy), Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. assistance programs provided training, institution building and other support to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chavez government.”
On closer examination, though, it becomes clear that Weisbrot is quoting selectively, simply cherry-picking parts of the document to make them conform to his otherwise-unsupported theory and leaving out those sections that do not fit. Here is the entirety of the statement from the State Department review of policy toward Venezuela during the period Nov. 2001-Apr. 2002 that Weisbrot quotes from: The Office of the Inspector General “found nothing to indicate that U.S. assistance programs to Venezuela, including those funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), were inconsistent with U.S. law or policy. While it is clear that NED, Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. assistance programs provided training, institution building and other support to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chavez government, we found no evidence that this support directly contributed, or was intended to contribute, to that event.”
At another point, the same State Department policy review also explicitly addresses the Stone-Weisbrot argument that the United States government was “involved” in the coup and rejects it outright. Stone and Weisbrot, however, fail to cite any part of this section of the document, and I think I know why. They are engaged in the age-old practice that Latin Americans call “vendiendo gato por liebre,” or “selling a cat as a hare,” and it simply won’t do to introduce any evidence that would reveal their theory to be based on a manipulation of the facts. But here is what the same State Department study that Weisbrot cites as the foundation for this “major point of the film” actually has to say:
The second half of South of the Border deals with a group of South American presidents who Stone argues are cut from the same cloth as Chavez and are part of a Chavez-led movement “away from the IMF and the United States’ economic controls.” But here too Stone, Weisbrot and Ali play fast and loose with the facts. Their treatment of each of the six countries they look at is filled with errors and misrepresentations, but I will confine myself to the one issue about which they were most dismissive in Stone’s letter to HNN: the attempted privatization of the water supply in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
In my original article I pointed out that, contrary to what Tariq Ali claims, the Bolivian government did not “sell the water supply of Cochabamba to Bechtel, a U.S. corporation,” and did not pass a law making it “illegal for poor people to go out onto the roofs and collect rainwater in receptacles.” In reality, the government granted a forty year management concession to a consortium that included Bechtel, in return for injections of capital to expand and improve water service.
Tariq Ali maintains I am “really reaching” because “for practical purposes” there is no essential distinction between owning a company and having a contract to manage it on behalf of its owner. This is nonsense. One of the foundations of any civilized society is the rule of law, which includes explicit definitions of ownership of property and other assets. When you lease an automobile from a dealership, you don’t own the car. When you rent a flat from a landlord, you don’t own the apartment. It’s as simple as that, and when a government grants you the right to manage a water company, you don’t own the company. The government does, and can terminate the arrangement if the managers don't fulfill the contract, which is what happened in Cochabamba. In the real world, anyone attempting to argue that “for practical purposes” there is no difference between a lease and a sale would be laughed out of court. I suppose it is not surprising that Tariq Ali, an editor of the New Left Review who describes himself as a “former” Trotskyite, should be fuzzy on concepts of private property, but is Stone and Weisbrot’s excuse?
When I asked Tariq Ali the source of his information about the botched water privatization in Cochabamba, he said that he had heard of it from Bolivian activists at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. I was about to ask Ali, who actually is a historian and therefore ought to know better, why he hadn’t bothered to verify the information, when Oliver Stone impatiently broke into the conversation to complain that I was trying to “porcupine this thing to death.” But history is about nuance, and the devil is in the details. Stone, however, isn’t interested in facts or nuance: he wants only to tell a story, even if it is grossly inaccurate, that will draw viewers into the theater.
President Obama spoke recently about those who suffer from what he called “willful blindness,” who are unable to recognize or admit facts that cannot be contested and instead spin elaborate fantasies based on cherished beliefs they cannot abandon. He was talking about North Korea and perhaps also indirectly about the Tea Party types who believe he is a socialist born in Kenya. But Stone, Weisbrot and Tariq Ali suffer from this very same disease, and their willful blindness has fatally infected South of the Border. They can attack me as much as they like, and I suspect they are likely to continue to do so, but that is just a smokescreen. Nothing, including insults and smears, can change the facts, one of which is that they have made a tendentious and dishonest film whose arguments collapse when subjected even to the slightest bit of scrutiny.
Oliver Stone Still Doesn't Get It
By Larry Rohter
Larry Rohter is a graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, where he majored in history, economics and political science, and also has a master’s degree from Columbia University’s School of International Affairs, where he specialized in Modern Chinese History and Politics. From 1977 to 2008 he was primarily a foreign correspondent in Latin America and Asia, first for Newsweek and then for The New York Times, where he is now a culture reporter. He is the author of “Deu no New York Times” (2008: Objetiva), a Portuguese-language best-seller in Brazil, and “Brazil on the Rise,” which will be published September 1 by Palgrave Macmillan.
One month ago, I incurred the wrath of Oliver Stone for stating the obvious in an article I wrote: his new movie South of the Border, ostensibly a “documentary” about Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and a group of supposedly like-minded South American colleagues, is so riddled with errors, misrepresentations, fabrications and fraudulent statistics as to be useless except as an example of over-the-top propaganda. At the screening for the movie that I attended, I counted more than two dozen assertions that are demonstrably incorrect, but chose, in the limited space available to me, to focus on but a handful.
Stone’s response wasn’t long in coming. Though he had acknowledged and apologized for several of his mistakes in a pair of interviews I did with him before writing my fact-checking article, he changed course as soon as the piece appeared, circulating an attempt at a rebuttal while also launching a smear campaign against me and my work with the assistance of sympathetic pro-Chavez solidarity groups and websites. To hear them tell it, I am a CIA agent, coup supporter, racist, coup denier, “tool of the corporate media,” reactionary and defender of rapacious multinational companies. One “solidarity” website went so far as to suggest I be assassinated, and I suppose that if I had looked hard enough, I would even have found myself accused of beating my wife.
All of this is nonsense, of course, a diversionary tactic meant to draw attention away from further discussion of the manifold failings of Stone’s film. The same goes for the written claims, full of indisputably false assertions, which Stone and his two screenwriters, Mark Weisbrot and Tariq Ali, have sent to a number of news organizations and websites, including HNN. I don’t intend to test the patience or limited interest of readers with a point-by-point refutation of Stone’s letter here. But it is worthwhile to examine a few of his more egregious errors and specious claims, because they say something about the way he and his associates think and work.
In my original article, for example, I pointed to the film’s erroneous contention that “the United States imports more oil from Venezuela than any other OPEC nation.” In fact, that distinction has long belonged to Saudi Arabia. But rather than admit their error, Stone and especially Weisbrot, who as the principal screenwriter is responsible for the bulk of the most glaring mistakes, have shifted position several times, trying to redefine what years should be taken into account and whether the standard of measurement should be “oil,” as stated in the film, or “petroleum and derivatives,” their fall-back position.
None of this attempted sleight of hand changes the bottom line. No matter how Stone and Weisbrot try to twist the numbers, they continue to be wrong. Here are the official statistics comparing U.S. oil imports from Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, compiled by the U.S. Department of Energy and expressed in thousands of barrels, for every single year since Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999:
YEAR S. Arabia Venezuela
1999 506,272 419,893
2000 557,569 447,736
2001 588,075 471,243
2002 554,500 438,270
2003 629,820 431,704
2004 547,125 474,531
2005 527,287 452,914
2006 519,236 417,001
2007 528,189 419,180
2008 550,276 380,419
2009 360,934 352,278
Weisbrot is an economist, not a historian, and apparently not a very good one. Either he is so incompetent that he can’t read a simple table or he is deliberately manipulating the numbers. The latter seems more likely, since reputable economists have chastised him for such lapses in the past. For example, Francisco Rodriguez, a Venezuelan who once was chief economist for the Venezuelan Congress and now teaches at Wesleyan University, has written a scathing paper called “How Not to Defend the Revolution: Mark Weisbrot and the Misinterpretation of Venezuelan Evidence.” In it, he notes that “Weisbrot’s critiques are generally invalid, relying on erroneous reading of the evidence or use of severely biased indicators,” which is exactly the problem here.
In the face of what is uncontestable evidence, Weisbrot is now attempting to argue that his mistake is “irrelevant” or inconsequential. This too is false, for at least two reasons. First of all, this effort to bend, twist and distort irrefutable statistics about oil is indicative of a reckless disregard for the facts that is much broader and, in fact, pervades all of South of the Border. If Stone, Weisbrot and Ali can’t get even the simplest details correct, why should any filmgoer or scholar believe any of their other assertions?
More importantly, the notion of Venezuela as the chief source of OPEC oil for the U.S. is a fundamental building block in one of Stone, Weisbrot and Ali’s larger and more important arguments. In the movie, Hugo Chavez is quoted as follows, speaking of himself in the third person: “The coup against Hugo Chavez had one motive, oil. First, Chavez, oil. Second, Saddam, Iraq.” Stone endorses and furthers this idea by saying onscreen that “the same strategy as Iraq was applied to the upheavals in South America.”
In reality, the reasons for the April 2002 coup that briefly overthrew Chavez remain a matter of intense dispute even now. Opposition groups and Venezuelan military officers contend that they acted because Chavez was making an unconstitutional power grab and may have ordered troops and his own supporters to fire on unarmed protestors. In an effort to shift the focus from that counter-argument and snooker viewers who have not followed the rise, fall and resurrection of Hugo Chavez, Stone and Weisbrot have had to inflate Venezuela’s declining global importance as an oil producer.
A second leg of this same argument is that Chavez incurred the wrath of the United States and the oil industry because under him “the government got control of the oil industry for the first time,” a phrase Stone repeats more than once in the film. This too is false. Venezuela nationalized the oil industry in 1976, when Carlos Andres Perez was president, and folded all foreign-owned companies into a single state-run entity. But Hugo Chavez despises Carlos Andres Perez, who jailed him after Chavez’s failed coup attempt in 1992, and never passes up a chance to undermine his image or attack him. As Chavez’s faithful stenographers, Stone and Weisbrot merely parrot Chavez’s argument, without bothering to check to see if it is true. It is not.
South of the Border is riddled with other errors and misinformation like this, but Stone and Weisbrot refuse to acknowledge them. They continue to insist, for instance, that Chavez’s main opponent in the 1998 election was not Henrique Salas Romer, the former state governor who got 40 percent of the vote, but Irene Saez, the beauty queen who received a mere 3 percent. By that novel and bizarre standard, George Bush’s main opponent in the 2000 election was not Al Gore but Ralph Nader, and Ronald Reagan’s main opponent in the 1980 election was not Jimmy Carter but John Anderson. Their defense is to refer to early 1997, when Chavez and Saez were the only candidates of note. But the election was held in December 1998, not in January 1997, and in any case they never at any time mention Salas Romer, thus conveying to viewers the false impression that the election was from start to finish a contest between “beauty and the beast.” As far as they are concerned, Salas Romer simply doesn’t exist, but hey, never let the facts get in the way of a good story line.
Speaking of Jimmy Carter, it’s worth noting that the non-partisan, international election monitoring commission that he headed issued an official assessment of the 1998 vote that is identical to mine and completely contradicts the characterization Stone, Weisbrot and Ali have concocted in South of the Border. It is ridiculous at this late date that the three of them are trying to rewrite history and challenge an assessment endorsed by all of the participants in the 1998 election, including Hugo Chavez himself. Here is the relevant passage from the Carter Center’s report:
“The leading candidate, according to latest polls, was Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez, a 44-year-old charismatic populist who was the most fervent in his commitment to make drastic changes in the political system. His major challenger was Henrique Salas Romer, a Yale graduate who also promised to change the existing political structure.
Chavez had led an unsuccessful coup attempt against the incumbent government in 1992, was incarcerated, never put on trial, and later released by President Caldera. He seemed to appeal to a poorer constituency than Salas, and was feared by the elite establishment, while still enjoying some support from the business community.
The other candidates seemed to rank quite low in the polls, including Irene Saez (former Miss Universe endorsed by the COPEI party) and Luis Alfaro (77 year old leader of the Accion Democratica Party.”In their letter to HNN and other websites, Stone and company complain that “Rohter was presented with detailed and documentary evidence of the United States’ involvement in the 2002 coup” against Chavez, which they describe as “a major point of the film” that has gone unreported in the mainstream press. They complain that I “simply dismissed all of this evidence out of hand, and nothing about it appears in the article.” This is false. In reality, I examined their “evidence” thoroughly, and discovered that the document Stone, Weisbrot and Ali cite as the main proof of their argument actually contradicts and undermines what they have to say. Their claim is thus specious and disingenuous, at least on the basis of the “evidence” they provide, which is why no mention was made of this subject in my original article.
But I’m perfectly willing to have that debate now, because it says something about how Stone, and especially Weisbrot, continually attempt to hoodwink the unwary viewer. In the movie, the image of the cover of a U.S. government document appears briefly on the screen as the April 2002 coup is being discussed. When I asked Weisbrot about that, he said that it was a State Department study in which State acknowledged its “involvement” in the coup. Specifically, he pointed to this passage: “NED (the National Endowment for Democracy), Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. assistance programs provided training, institution building and other support to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chavez government.”
On closer examination, though, it becomes clear that Weisbrot is quoting selectively, simply cherry-picking parts of the document to make them conform to his otherwise-unsupported theory and leaving out those sections that do not fit. Here is the entirety of the statement from the State Department review of policy toward Venezuela during the period Nov. 2001-Apr. 2002 that Weisbrot quotes from: The Office of the Inspector General “found nothing to indicate that U.S. assistance programs to Venezuela, including those funded by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), were inconsistent with U.S. law or policy. While it is clear that NED, Department of Defense (DOD), and other U.S. assistance programs provided training, institution building and other support to individuals and organizations understood to be actively involved in the brief ouster of the Chavez government, we found no evidence that this support directly contributed, or was intended to contribute, to that event.”
At another point, the same State Department policy review also explicitly addresses the Stone-Weisbrot argument that the United States government was “involved” in the coup and rejects it outright. Stone and Weisbrot, however, fail to cite any part of this section of the document, and I think I know why. They are engaged in the age-old practice that Latin Americans call “vendiendo gato por liebre,” or “selling a cat as a hare,” and it simply won’t do to introduce any evidence that would reveal their theory to be based on a manipulation of the facts. But here is what the same State Department study that Weisbrot cites as the foundation for this “major point of the film” actually has to say:
4. “Did opponents of the Chávez government, if any, who met with embassy or Department officials request or seek the support of the U.S. government for actions aimed at removing or undermining that government? If so, what was the response of embassy or Department officials to such requests? How were any such responses conveyed, orally or in writing?”
Taking the question to be whether, in any such meetings, Chávez opponents sought help from the embassy or the Department for removing or undermining the Chávez government through undemocratic or unconstitutional means, the answer is no.
Chávez opponents would instead inform their U.S. interlocutors of their (or, more frequently, others’) aims, intentions, and/or plans. United States officials consistently responded to such declarations with statements opposing any effort to remove or undermine the Chávez government through undemocratic and unconstitutional means. These responses were conveyed orally.Weisbrot obviously needs to go back to the dictionary and look up the meaning of “involve.” Does he provide any evidence whatsoever that the United States was “drawn in as an associate or participant” in the coup? He does not. Instead he suggests a nebulous standard that, if applied in other situations, would work something like this: if I teach a course in finance, and a year after the conclusion of that course one of my former students robs a bank, I am somehow “involved” in the robbery. This is not just ridiculous, it’s also dishonest.
The second half of South of the Border deals with a group of South American presidents who Stone argues are cut from the same cloth as Chavez and are part of a Chavez-led movement “away from the IMF and the United States’ economic controls.” But here too Stone, Weisbrot and Ali play fast and loose with the facts. Their treatment of each of the six countries they look at is filled with errors and misrepresentations, but I will confine myself to the one issue about which they were most dismissive in Stone’s letter to HNN: the attempted privatization of the water supply in Cochabamba, Bolivia.
In my original article I pointed out that, contrary to what Tariq Ali claims, the Bolivian government did not “sell the water supply of Cochabamba to Bechtel, a U.S. corporation,” and did not pass a law making it “illegal for poor people to go out onto the roofs and collect rainwater in receptacles.” In reality, the government granted a forty year management concession to a consortium that included Bechtel, in return for injections of capital to expand and improve water service.
Tariq Ali maintains I am “really reaching” because “for practical purposes” there is no essential distinction between owning a company and having a contract to manage it on behalf of its owner. This is nonsense. One of the foundations of any civilized society is the rule of law, which includes explicit definitions of ownership of property and other assets. When you lease an automobile from a dealership, you don’t own the car. When you rent a flat from a landlord, you don’t own the apartment. It’s as simple as that, and when a government grants you the right to manage a water company, you don’t own the company. The government does, and can terminate the arrangement if the managers don't fulfill the contract, which is what happened in Cochabamba. In the real world, anyone attempting to argue that “for practical purposes” there is no difference between a lease and a sale would be laughed out of court. I suppose it is not surprising that Tariq Ali, an editor of the New Left Review who describes himself as a “former” Trotskyite, should be fuzzy on concepts of private property, but is Stone and Weisbrot’s excuse?
When I asked Tariq Ali the source of his information about the botched water privatization in Cochabamba, he said that he had heard of it from Bolivian activists at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. I was about to ask Ali, who actually is a historian and therefore ought to know better, why he hadn’t bothered to verify the information, when Oliver Stone impatiently broke into the conversation to complain that I was trying to “porcupine this thing to death.” But history is about nuance, and the devil is in the details. Stone, however, isn’t interested in facts or nuance: he wants only to tell a story, even if it is grossly inaccurate, that will draw viewers into the theater.
President Obama spoke recently about those who suffer from what he called “willful blindness,” who are unable to recognize or admit facts that cannot be contested and instead spin elaborate fantasies based on cherished beliefs they cannot abandon. He was talking about North Korea and perhaps also indirectly about the Tea Party types who believe he is a socialist born in Kenya. But Stone, Weisbrot and Tariq Ali suffer from this very same disease, and their willful blindness has fatally infected South of the Border. They can attack me as much as they like, and I suspect they are likely to continue to do so, but that is just a smokescreen. Nothing, including insults and smears, can change the facts, one of which is that they have made a tendentious and dishonest film whose arguments collapse when subjected even to the slightest bit of scrutiny.
15 March 2010
ETA in Venezuela
Justice Eloy Velasco, of Spain's High Court, indicted a number of ETA terrorists, and shed light on the professional relationship that some of them have with the Chavez regime. This has rattled the Venezuelan caudillo, who seems somewhat uncomfortable about people being able to post this kind of information online. Since Velasco's indictment, there's been a lot of talk about ETA presence in Venezuela in the media. Arturo Cubillas Fontan, ETA member at the centre of the accusations, and who has been in Venezuela since late 80ies, is married to Goizeder Odriozola Lataillade, who once was Chavez secretary. Cubillas Fontan works as head of security of Venezuela's Ministry of Land, and has Venezuelan citizenship. Chavez, being his customary thuggish self, has denied everything, and is yet to announce anything indicative of an investigation, dismissal, or arrest of Cubillas Fontan. As Francisco Toro argues, the "Venezuelan government isn't obliquely "sponsoring" terrorists; it's employing them outright."
This whole ETA issue brings a lot of memories. In 1978, my grand parents and mother, of Basque origin and living in Venezuela at the time, decided to move back to the Basque country. During my years in Zarauz, between 1978 and 1984, I developed a close friendship with a guy called Javi (Javier or Xavier) Mutiozabal. "Mutio," as we used to call him, had two brothers: one called Felix and, the eldest, called Jose Angel. For us kids, the fact that Jose Angel used to boast that he belonged to ETA meant nothing. I never gave a second thought to it, despite the fact that my grand father, arrested on trumped charges, and tortured during Franco's years, kept slamming the antics of ETA, arguing that those, so called ETA nationalists, were nowhere to be found when the Gudaris, as nationalists are called in the Basque country, decided to fight Franco. In my grand father's opinion, there was no point in fighting against the Spanish State for Basque language, culture, or right to exist, post Franco's death. "One doesn't fight with terror in a democracy," he often told me.
The reality in the street was different though, for the death of Franco, and arrival of democracy had just emboldened ETA. Jose Angel was living proof of it, everyone about town knew of his involvement with ETA, and no one did anything about it. Further, he wasn't the only one who openly supported ETA. However when GAL appeared on the scene, and ETA's members corpses started popping up everywhere, Jose Angel, and many others, got scared and decided to flee. Thus I got privy, because of my friendship with Mutio, that his brother Jose Angel had gone to Venezuela, and was working in Caracas' Centro Vasco. So I started researching about him, and what follows is what I have been able to find, thus far.
Jose Angel Mutiozabal Galarraga, Venezuelan ID. 24.227.276, D.O.B. 23/12/1962, pops up in a ruling, which demonstrates, yet again, that Venezuelan authorities, as recently as March 2006, have been made aware of commercial activities in Venezuela of ETA members. In the ruling one can read names such as Eugenio Barrutiabengoa Zabarte, and Ignacio Lequerica Urresti. Barrutiabengoa Zabarte has caused some diplomatic incidents between the governments of Spain and Venezuela in the past. He was arrested, and freed, in 1996. An arrest warrant to apprehend him was issued by the Attorney's Office in May 2002, which was reiterated by Venezuela's Supreme Court in March 2006. In 2006, the Chavez regime assured that it would not grant citizenship to Barrutiabengoa Zabarte and other wanted ETA members. In 2002, Arturo Cubillas Fontan was arrested for "preventing the course of justice", read for protecting Barrutiabengoa and other ETA terrorists. He was promptly released. The fact that Jose Angel Mutiozabal had the chutzpah of seeking redress from authorities, about business transactions of ETA's underworld in Venezuela, shows just how comfortable these people are with the current regime. Intelligence sources in Venezuela have been aware of their presence, and whereabouts, in the country since they arrived, and yet arrest warrants issued in 2002 need reiteration in 2006, owing to lack of action on behalf of authorities. So how can Chavez dare argue that his regime does not protect terrorists? How come ETA members, and people suspected of connections to ETA, have been granted Venezuelan citizenship? How come Chavez has not ordered the arrest of a man who's married to his former secretary?
Chavez is in bed with terrorist groups. Chavez has suspended relations with Colombia, on four occasions, over FARC issues, meets, and poses, with internationally wanted criminals in Miraflores. He also employs them. Let's see if he can prevent this information to be posted online.
Addendum: as news that a another member of ETA employed by Chavez emerge, I have been able to connect, what I think could be another dot in the network of ETA in Venezuela. In the ruling where the names of Jose Angel Mutiozabal, Eugenio Barrutiabengoa and Ignacio Lequerica can be read, there's another one that caught my attention: Maria Eizaguirre. It is entirely possible that whoever transcribed those names made spelling mistakes, which is quite common in the case of Basque last names. In the late 80ies I bought motorbikes, and got involved in motocross, and enduro racing. In that setting, I met people like Ronald Morett, and I also met Fernando Arias, whose mother, Maria Izaguirre de Arias, ID. 6114620, D.O.B. 25/06/1938, also of Basque origin, was involved in some form of ETA-support network, whereby newly arrived ETA terrorists were helped by members of the Basque community in Venezuela. Could the Maria Eizaguirre cited in the ruling be the same as Maria Izaguirre de Arias involved in helping ETA terrorists? Authorities would do well in pondering on that question.
This whole ETA issue brings a lot of memories. In 1978, my grand parents and mother, of Basque origin and living in Venezuela at the time, decided to move back to the Basque country. During my years in Zarauz, between 1978 and 1984, I developed a close friendship with a guy called Javi (Javier or Xavier) Mutiozabal. "Mutio," as we used to call him, had two brothers: one called Felix and, the eldest, called Jose Angel. For us kids, the fact that Jose Angel used to boast that he belonged to ETA meant nothing. I never gave a second thought to it, despite the fact that my grand father, arrested on trumped charges, and tortured during Franco's years, kept slamming the antics of ETA, arguing that those, so called ETA nationalists, were nowhere to be found when the Gudaris, as nationalists are called in the Basque country, decided to fight Franco. In my grand father's opinion, there was no point in fighting against the Spanish State for Basque language, culture, or right to exist, post Franco's death. "One doesn't fight with terror in a democracy," he often told me.
The reality in the street was different though, for the death of Franco, and arrival of democracy had just emboldened ETA. Jose Angel was living proof of it, everyone about town knew of his involvement with ETA, and no one did anything about it. Further, he wasn't the only one who openly supported ETA. However when GAL appeared on the scene, and ETA's members corpses started popping up everywhere, Jose Angel, and many others, got scared and decided to flee. Thus I got privy, because of my friendship with Mutio, that his brother Jose Angel had gone to Venezuela, and was working in Caracas' Centro Vasco. So I started researching about him, and what follows is what I have been able to find, thus far.
Jose Angel Mutiozabal Galarraga, Venezuelan ID. 24.227.276, D.O.B. 23/12/1962, pops up in a ruling, which demonstrates, yet again, that Venezuelan authorities, as recently as March 2006, have been made aware of commercial activities in Venezuela of ETA members. In the ruling one can read names such as Eugenio Barrutiabengoa Zabarte, and Ignacio Lequerica Urresti. Barrutiabengoa Zabarte has caused some diplomatic incidents between the governments of Spain and Venezuela in the past. He was arrested, and freed, in 1996. An arrest warrant to apprehend him was issued by the Attorney's Office in May 2002, which was reiterated by Venezuela's Supreme Court in March 2006. In 2006, the Chavez regime assured that it would not grant citizenship to Barrutiabengoa Zabarte and other wanted ETA members. In 2002, Arturo Cubillas Fontan was arrested for "preventing the course of justice", read for protecting Barrutiabengoa and other ETA terrorists. He was promptly released. The fact that Jose Angel Mutiozabal had the chutzpah of seeking redress from authorities, about business transactions of ETA's underworld in Venezuela, shows just how comfortable these people are with the current regime. Intelligence sources in Venezuela have been aware of their presence, and whereabouts, in the country since they arrived, and yet arrest warrants issued in 2002 need reiteration in 2006, owing to lack of action on behalf of authorities. So how can Chavez dare argue that his regime does not protect terrorists? How come ETA members, and people suspected of connections to ETA, have been granted Venezuelan citizenship? How come Chavez has not ordered the arrest of a man who's married to his former secretary?
Chavez is in bed with terrorist groups. Chavez has suspended relations with Colombia, on four occasions, over FARC issues, meets, and poses, with internationally wanted criminals in Miraflores. He also employs them. Let's see if he can prevent this information to be posted online.
Addendum: as news that a another member of ETA employed by Chavez emerge, I have been able to connect, what I think could be another dot in the network of ETA in Venezuela. In the ruling where the names of Jose Angel Mutiozabal, Eugenio Barrutiabengoa and Ignacio Lequerica can be read, there's another one that caught my attention: Maria Eizaguirre. It is entirely possible that whoever transcribed those names made spelling mistakes, which is quite common in the case of Basque last names. In the late 80ies I bought motorbikes, and got involved in motocross, and enduro racing. In that setting, I met people like Ronald Morett, and I also met Fernando Arias, whose mother, Maria Izaguirre de Arias, ID. 6114620, D.O.B. 25/06/1938, also of Basque origin, was involved in some form of ETA-support network, whereby newly arrived ETA terrorists were helped by members of the Basque community in Venezuela. Could the Maria Eizaguirre cited in the ruling be the same as Maria Izaguirre de Arias involved in helping ETA terrorists? Authorities would do well in pondering on that question.
18 February 2010
El "por ahora" se convierte en "¿y ahora?"
He aqui un chavista arrepentido, que ha votado muchas veces por Chavez. El se pregunta, ¿y ahora? Ahora es cuando van a pagar todos los venezolanos, hayan votado por Chavez o no, las consecuencias de tener un megalómano galopante e inepto en el poder, debido a las muchas veces que gente como Omar ha votado por el militar golpista. ¿Y ahora? Alpargata que lo que viene es joropo, o mejor aun, chupense ese caramelito de pus.
RCTVi demonstrates illegality of Venezuela media watchdog
Today's communiqué from RCTV International (RCTVi) deserves attention, and a translation:
To justify the suspension of RCTVi by cable companies, Minister Diosdado Cabello has recourse to all sorts of arguments. He started saying that RCTVi had to comply with the limitations and regulations imposed on national TV companies, given it had broadcast a high percentage of locally produced content, during the 4 months prior to 22 December 2009, when new regulations were published and came into force.
It just so happens that in the 4 months period described, RCTVi could have broadcast 100% of nationally produced content, for at that time, laws regulating allowed percentages of national versus internationally produced content were not even in place, ergo there were no limitations in this respect. The insistence in applying the law retroactively, that is during the 4 months prior to the date it came into effect, breaches the principle of irretroactivity of law.
Given national and international condemnation for the violation of this universally accepted principle, the government then argued that CONATEL (Venezuela's media watchdog) had not shut any channels, it was rather cable companies that had decided to remove RCTVi signal from its programming.
It was evident for all, as reflected in the OAS communiqué, that the government threatened cable operators, if these failed to take off its programming TV companies that did not comply with the law. These companies, without written warnings, in total absence of administrative or legal procedures, without sentence or court orders, bowed to the government's pressure. This sets a grave precedent in human rights in Venezuela, for the government used private companies as instruments of repression.
Lastly, despite the fact that RCTVi had filled paperwork required by law with CONATEL, on 13 January 2010, that is to say, two days before the established deadline, the government tried to justify its decision arguing that RCTVi had not presented itself before the watchdog, "adopting an arrogant stance." On 8 February, RCTVi filled required documentation again, this time with CONATEL's legal council, that officially acknowledged receipt of paperwork, for the second time.
On 11 February, CONATEL replied to RCTVi, accepting that RCTVi had, in fact, handed in required paperwork and relevant documentation in the dates described, however it ruled that RCTVi was classified as a national broadcaster on the basis of programming broadcast between 22 September and 21 December 2009, that is to say applying the law retroactively, which is illegal and unconstitutional.
Thus it remains clear, firstly, that Minister Cabello argument that RCTVi had not gone to CONATEL to hand in documentation was incorrect. Secondly, the decision of classifying RCTVi as a national, rather than international, broadcaster, continues to be supported on a retroactive application of the law. Thirdly, Minister Cabello's intention has always been to exert undue pressure on cable operators so that RCTVi's signal is taken off the programming.
We carry on with the struggle of getting back the open signal that was illegally taken from us, with the certainty that soon we shall be able to provide again information and entertainment to millions of Venezuelans...
To justify the suspension of RCTVi by cable companies, Minister Diosdado Cabello has recourse to all sorts of arguments. He started saying that RCTVi had to comply with the limitations and regulations imposed on national TV companies, given it had broadcast a high percentage of locally produced content, during the 4 months prior to 22 December 2009, when new regulations were published and came into force.
It just so happens that in the 4 months period described, RCTVi could have broadcast 100% of nationally produced content, for at that time, laws regulating allowed percentages of national versus internationally produced content were not even in place, ergo there were no limitations in this respect. The insistence in applying the law retroactively, that is during the 4 months prior to the date it came into effect, breaches the principle of irretroactivity of law.
Given national and international condemnation for the violation of this universally accepted principle, the government then argued that CONATEL (Venezuela's media watchdog) had not shut any channels, it was rather cable companies that had decided to remove RCTVi signal from its programming.
It was evident for all, as reflected in the OAS communiqué, that the government threatened cable operators, if these failed to take off its programming TV companies that did not comply with the law. These companies, without written warnings, in total absence of administrative or legal procedures, without sentence or court orders, bowed to the government's pressure. This sets a grave precedent in human rights in Venezuela, for the government used private companies as instruments of repression.
Lastly, despite the fact that RCTVi had filled paperwork required by law with CONATEL, on 13 January 2010, that is to say, two days before the established deadline, the government tried to justify its decision arguing that RCTVi had not presented itself before the watchdog, "adopting an arrogant stance." On 8 February, RCTVi filled required documentation again, this time with CONATEL's legal council, that officially acknowledged receipt of paperwork, for the second time.
On 11 February, CONATEL replied to RCTVi, accepting that RCTVi had, in fact, handed in required paperwork and relevant documentation in the dates described, however it ruled that RCTVi was classified as a national broadcaster on the basis of programming broadcast between 22 September and 21 December 2009, that is to say applying the law retroactively, which is illegal and unconstitutional.
Thus it remains clear, firstly, that Minister Cabello argument that RCTVi had not gone to CONATEL to hand in documentation was incorrect. Secondly, the decision of classifying RCTVi as a national, rather than international, broadcaster, continues to be supported on a retroactive application of the law. Thirdly, Minister Cabello's intention has always been to exert undue pressure on cable operators so that RCTVi's signal is taken off the programming.
We carry on with the struggle of getting back the open signal that was illegally taken from us, with the certainty that soon we shall be able to provide again information and entertainment to millions of Venezuelans...
10 January 2010
Invasion of Venezuela or Caracas Chronicles debacle?
Caracas Chronicles is one of the four longest-running blogs that have been covering the collapse of our country's democracy, for a predominantly English audience. It's author, Francisco Toro, is, without a doubt, perhaps the most eloquent writer we have on our side. Toro has for ages claimed that professional journalism simply does not exist in Venezuela, with which I agree to an extent. Toro is very passionate about defending the importance of sticking to facts, when reporting the stuff that comes out of Chavez's Venezuela, with which I fully agree.
Needless to say that Toro, as good a writer as he is, is far from infallible. His latest, linked to by The Guardian's Rory Carroll (in another example of appalling journalism), does more to harm the stance he so feverishly defends and his own approach to sticking to facts, than prove that the incident of the P3 plane that allegedly ventured into Venezuelan airspace is a botched job of the Chavez propaganda apparatus.
I left the following comment in his blog, for Gene of Harry's Place fame, in the hope he'll retract and set a nice precedent for all of us to follow:
Needless to say that Toro, as good a writer as he is, is far from infallible. His latest, linked to by The Guardian's Rory Carroll (in another example of appalling journalism), does more to harm the stance he so feverishly defends and his own approach to sticking to facts, than prove that the incident of the P3 plane that allegedly ventured into Venezuelan airspace is a botched job of the Chavez propaganda apparatus.
I left the following comment in his blog, for Gene of Harry's Place fame, in the hope he'll retract and set a nice precedent for all of us to follow:
... avion P3 de este tipo... Meaning a P3 airplane of this type, ergo the picture was used for illustration purposes, and was not, as this blog entry claims, that Chavez said that picture of plane is the original.
Link to Chavez's words:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMoYHgD7RVk
A retraction is in order FT, pronto, you are/were, after all, a professional journo, right?
17 November 2009
Venezuela’s corruption level equal to war-torn nations
But if one were to take murder rates, largely unpunished owing to a totally useless and careless State that profits from it, then Chavez-land is in a league of its own, not only among war-torn nations, but among any other type. After all, Caracas was defined as the capital murder of the world.
5 January 2009
Noam Chomsky fails academic standards demanded from HRW
A few days ago, we published in Miguel's blog a public letter in response to the 100 or so 'Latin America experts' who criticised HRW's report on Venezuela, so there's no point in rehashhing its arguments here. But as the 'experts' stated that HRW's report "does not meet even the most minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility" we decided to check whether the criticizing signatories do observe those standards they are demanding from HRW. In order to do this, we conducted a little experiment and chose from the list the only academic with a global reputation, Noam Chomsky that is. Since Chomsky signed the letter in his professional capacity, as Professor of Linguistics, Massachusets Institute of Technology, I sent him an email. The exchange is pasted below. As can be read, Chomsky does not apply minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality and accuracy. Further, Chomsky is not even bothered by the fact that propagandists of Hugo Chavez are using his name, and that of the institution he works for, to lend 'credibility' to spurious and baseless allegations, as rightly stated by HRW, in its response to them.
----- Original Message -----
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/3/2009 11:22 AM
Subject: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
Dear Professor Chomsky,
Here's hope that this email finds you well. A few days ago, I saw your
name as signatory of an open letter
[http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2008/12/17-2] that a group of
people addressed to HRW, wherein criticism about lack of academic
standards of veracity and objectivity was expressed. Since you are
identified as Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, I am taken the liberty to write to this MIT email address of
yours.
In that respect, and without intention of delving into the personal
motivations you may have had to lend your name and credentials for such
purpose, I would like to ask one thing: the letter claims that I am a
"mentally unstable opposition blogger," therefore could you please send
me copy of the academic studies, or research, upon which such remark is
based?
With best wishes,
Aleksander Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/3/2009 5:06 PM
To: Alek Boyd
You'd have to contact the initiators of the statement, maybe Greg Grandin or
the other Latin Americanists who formulated the statement.
Noam Chomsky
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/3/2009 5:20 PM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Well, thanks for such a swift reply Professor Chomsky, but your name is
on that list and I would have thought that signatories to it, especially
those with a global reputation such as yourself, would exercise caution
at the time of allowing third parties to use your name and position to
support their public statements. That being the case, I respectfully
reiterate my initial request, perhaps you can pass it along to Greg
Grandin and the other Latin Americanists that conducted research about
my mental state.
Cordially, Alek Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/3/2009 8:09 PM
To: Alek Boyd
Nobody used my name. I don't know how involved you are in public statements. Signers are expected to know the basic facts, but not to research every specific detail. For that, they rely on the reputation for care and integrity of those who write and distribute the statements. If they were to research every particular fact there would never be a statement protesting the crimes of Iran or the Soviet Union or any atrocities anywhere.
There's no reason for me to forward your concerns to the Latin American academics who wrote and distributed the statement.
Noam Chomsky
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/3/2009 9:44 PM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Begging your pardon Professor Chomsky, but there is every reason for you to forward my concerns to those who wrote and distributed the statement, for your integrity is on the line. The public expects you to behave according to certain moral, ethical and professional standards, as an academic of considerable reputation. Allowing others to use use your name, and that of the institution you work for, for questionable political purposes, carries a duty of care towards statements made, as you have rightly pointed out. Your repeated negative to send me information pertaining what you call basic facts, or to put my concern to those who irresponsibly have used your name and credentials to discredit me, suggest that you are not aware of what your name has been used for and that those who have formulated the statement do not have any academic evidence to support their claims.
It should not be difficult for more than 100 purported Latin Americanist demanding "minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility" to others, to produce research and scholarly work upon which their arguments are based, or am I to suppose that they have failed the very principles they are demanding from others? No issue would have arisen had they signed that letter as private individuals, however as you are all using some form of professional accreditation or another, to lend credibility to your concerns, you are duty bound to, at the very least, inform the public about methods followed to arrive at certain conclusions.
It is extraordinary indeed to read from the intellectual claimed as the world's most influential, that every specific detail should not be researched. Alas a sign of the decaying, condescending, and rotten academic establishment of our times.
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/4/2009 3:13 AM
To: Alek Boyd
I'm sorry that you do not understand how petitions work, or that by your standards there would never be one. But that's your problem, not mine.
You can easily access the addresses of the Latin American academics who wrote and organized the petition, and if you have some objection, you can contact them.
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/4/2009 11:09 AM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
My only problem is that you have signed a letter, in your professional
capacity, where a statement about my mental state has been made, and
this exchange proves that you don't apply principles you, purportedly,
demand from others. You do know that claim made is not the conclusion of
research conducted by psychologists/psychiatrists or other such capable
accredited professionals, but rather it's an unsubstantiated accusation
made for political purposes. Worse still, you don't seem to care what
others say in your name.
I take that you are as prone to abandon minimum accuracy standards -to
side with ideological partners- as the guy next door, and for the
record, I am not interested in the slightest in communicating with the
propagandists who organized the petition. Of all the signatories, you
are the only one who does have a global academic standing to care for.
Therefore before escalating my concerns to MIT authorities, I will
respectfully ask you, for the third time, for academic evidence in the
form of research and studies conducted, which led you, Noam Chomsky,
Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to
sign a letter wherein I am referred to as a "mentally unstable
opposition blogger."
Thanking you in advance, Aleksander Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/4/2009 6:44 PM
To: Alek Boyd
I've already explained to you how you should remedy whatever problem you perceive, and why your charges make no sense at all, and if applied, would simply terminate all petitions -- whether from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or anyone else.
If you don't want to remedy the problem, I'm afraid I cannot help you.
Noam Chomsky
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/4/2009 10:13 PM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
It is not about how you want me to remedy the problem, but about how I
want you to remedy the problem and you can, in fact, help me, by simply
saying what sort of academic standards were followed to reach a
conclusion about my mental state. The onus is on you, for it was you who
signed a letter containing defamatory and baseless allegations.
Aleksander Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/5/2009 3:00 AM
To: Alek Boyd
I've explained to you how you can remedy the problem that you perceive. And I've explained to you the very reasonable standards for petitions. There is no point running through it again.
----End of exchange----
There are some aspects that need expanding on. First, it is truly a shame that serious and reputable organizations, such as MIT, allow staff to make use of institutional credentials for questionable political purposes of personal nature. Second, it is also a sad spectacle to see serious and reputable organizations, such as HRW, wasting limited resources and staff in addressing criticism from a bunch of sycophants (some of them, like Greg Wilpert for instance, having benefited from public funds dispensed by Hugo Chavez's revolution), for none qualifies as expert in anything other than official propaganda, as far as Venezuela is concerned. They are not valid interlocutors at discussing Venezuelan affairs, no one elected them and most, if not all, are not even Venezuelan. Third, it is evident that rigorous academic standards are not the forte of Chavez's international cheerleading squad, while their absolute ignorance of Venezuela's legislation and binding international human rights treaties is patent. Fourth, it is remarkable to read, from perhaps the world's most renowned leftist academic, admission that it is perfectly correct to be dishonest, false, inaccurate and sloppy.
----- Original Message -----
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/3/2009 11:22 AM
Subject: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
Dear Professor Chomsky,
Here's hope that this email finds you well. A few days ago, I saw your
name as signatory of an open letter
[http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2008/12/17-2] that a group of
people addressed to HRW, wherein criticism about lack of academic
standards of veracity and objectivity was expressed. Since you are
identified as Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, I am taken the liberty to write to this MIT email address of
yours.
In that respect, and without intention of delving into the personal
motivations you may have had to lend your name and credentials for such
purpose, I would like to ask one thing: the letter claims that I am a
"mentally unstable opposition blogger," therefore could you please send
me copy of the academic studies, or research, upon which such remark is
based?
With best wishes,
Aleksander Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/3/2009 5:06 PM
To: Alek Boyd
You'd have to contact the initiators of the statement, maybe Greg Grandin or
the other Latin Americanists who formulated the statement.
Noam Chomsky
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/3/2009 5:20 PM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Well, thanks for such a swift reply Professor Chomsky, but your name is
on that list and I would have thought that signatories to it, especially
those with a global reputation such as yourself, would exercise caution
at the time of allowing third parties to use your name and position to
support their public statements. That being the case, I respectfully
reiterate my initial request, perhaps you can pass it along to Greg
Grandin and the other Latin Americanists that conducted research about
my mental state.
Cordially, Alek Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/3/2009 8:09 PM
To: Alek Boyd
Nobody used my name. I don't know how involved you are in public statements. Signers are expected to know the basic facts, but not to research every specific detail. For that, they rely on the reputation for care and integrity of those who write and distribute the statements. If they were to research every particular fact there would never be a statement protesting the crimes of Iran or the Soviet Union or any atrocities anywhere.
There's no reason for me to forward your concerns to the Latin American academics who wrote and distributed the statement.
Noam Chomsky
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/3/2009 9:44 PM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Begging your pardon Professor Chomsky, but there is every reason for you to forward my concerns to those who wrote and distributed the statement, for your integrity is on the line. The public expects you to behave according to certain moral, ethical and professional standards, as an academic of considerable reputation. Allowing others to use use your name, and that of the institution you work for, for questionable political purposes, carries a duty of care towards statements made, as you have rightly pointed out. Your repeated negative to send me information pertaining what you call basic facts, or to put my concern to those who irresponsibly have used your name and credentials to discredit me, suggest that you are not aware of what your name has been used for and that those who have formulated the statement do not have any academic evidence to support their claims.
It should not be difficult for more than 100 purported Latin Americanist demanding "minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility" to others, to produce research and scholarly work upon which their arguments are based, or am I to suppose that they have failed the very principles they are demanding from others? No issue would have arisen had they signed that letter as private individuals, however as you are all using some form of professional accreditation or another, to lend credibility to your concerns, you are duty bound to, at the very least, inform the public about methods followed to arrive at certain conclusions.
It is extraordinary indeed to read from the intellectual claimed as the world's most influential, that every specific detail should not be researched. Alas a sign of the decaying, condescending, and rotten academic establishment of our times.
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/4/2009 3:13 AM
To: Alek Boyd
I'm sorry that you do not understand how petitions work, or that by your standards there would never be one. But that's your problem, not mine.
You can easily access the addresses of the Latin American academics who wrote and organized the petition, and if you have some objection, you can contact them.
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/4/2009 11:09 AM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
My only problem is that you have signed a letter, in your professional
capacity, where a statement about my mental state has been made, and
this exchange proves that you don't apply principles you, purportedly,
demand from others. You do know that claim made is not the conclusion of
research conducted by psychologists/psychiatrists or other such capable
accredited professionals, but rather it's an unsubstantiated accusation
made for political purposes. Worse still, you don't seem to care what
others say in your name.
I take that you are as prone to abandon minimum accuracy standards -to
side with ideological partners- as the guy next door, and for the
record, I am not interested in the slightest in communicating with the
propagandists who organized the petition. Of all the signatories, you
are the only one who does have a global academic standing to care for.
Therefore before escalating my concerns to MIT authorities, I will
respectfully ask you, for the third time, for academic evidence in the
form of research and studies conducted, which led you, Noam Chomsky,
Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to
sign a letter wherein I am referred to as a "mentally unstable
opposition blogger."
Thanking you in advance, Aleksander Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/4/2009 6:44 PM
To: Alek Boyd
I've already explained to you how you should remedy whatever problem you perceive, and why your charges make no sense at all, and if applied, would simply terminate all petitions -- whether from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or anyone else.
If you don't want to remedy the problem, I'm afraid I cannot help you.
Noam Chomsky
----- Original Message -----
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: "Alek Boyd"
Date: 1/4/2009 10:13 PM
To: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
It is not about how you want me to remedy the problem, but about how I
want you to remedy the problem and you can, in fact, help me, by simply
saying what sort of academic standards were followed to reach a
conclusion about my mental state. The onus is on you, for it was you who
signed a letter containing defamatory and baseless allegations.
Aleksander Boyd
Subject: Re: Your criticism of HRW's Venezuela report
From: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Reply to: Noam Chomsky <chomsky@mit.edu>
Date: 1/5/2009 3:00 AM
To: Alek Boyd
I've explained to you how you can remedy the problem that you perceive. And I've explained to you the very reasonable standards for petitions. There is no point running through it again.
----End of exchange----
There are some aspects that need expanding on. First, it is truly a shame that serious and reputable organizations, such as MIT, allow staff to make use of institutional credentials for questionable political purposes of personal nature. Second, it is also a sad spectacle to see serious and reputable organizations, such as HRW, wasting limited resources and staff in addressing criticism from a bunch of sycophants (some of them, like Greg Wilpert for instance, having benefited from public funds dispensed by Hugo Chavez's revolution), for none qualifies as expert in anything other than official propaganda, as far as Venezuela is concerned. They are not valid interlocutors at discussing Venezuelan affairs, no one elected them and most, if not all, are not even Venezuelan. Third, it is evident that rigorous academic standards are not the forte of Chavez's international cheerleading squad, while their absolute ignorance of Venezuela's legislation and binding international human rights treaties is patent. Fourth, it is remarkable to read, from perhaps the world's most renowned leftist academic, admission that it is perfectly correct to be dishonest, false, inaccurate and sloppy.
28 June 2008
The best definition of Venezuelan politics...
... comes from an article in the The Times about Zimbabwe:
Mugabe is not unpopular in Zimbabwe today because his Government has been autocratic and brutal. He is not unpopular because the minority (but substantial) Matabele tribe have been persecuted, killed and dispossessed by a governing party whose power base is among the Mashona majority. He is not unpopular because he and his wife are greedy and flaunt their wealth, or because corruption in his Government is widespread. He is unpopular because his administration is broken and there is nothing for ordinary people to eat.Change a few names and, voilá, the perfect definition of Venezuelan politics.
Many Zimbabweans hunger not for liberal democracy, but for food. By corollary, much of Morgan Tsvangirai's power base is either an urban minority or among the minority tribes who have received a raw deal from the distribution of resources by Zanu (PF). They too, many of them, hunger not for liberal democracy but a turning of the tables. Unless we are careful, today's TV pictures may tomorrow be thrown into reverse, and we may watch those who were once in flight, now in pursuit; and those who were once in pursuit, now in flight; the iron bars having changed hands.
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